Abstract
Introduction
Cloud computing can provide a flexible, dynamic, resilient and cost effective infrastructure for both academic and business environments, it rapidly expands as an alternative to conventional office based computing. Terminal clients can access the cloud based applications via a web browser or a lightweight desktop or mobile application while the business software and data are stored on the cloud servers at a remote location.
In the cloud paradigm, data owners move the large data files from their local computing systems to the remote servers, in which the data owners avoid the initial investment of expensive infrastructure setup, large equipment, and daily maintenance cost. But, security becomes one of the major concerns for all entities in cloud services. In order to solve the problem of data integrity verification, many proof of storage (POS) schemes are proposed under different systems and security models [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] .
Considering the role of the POS verifier, the POS protocols can be classified into two categories: private POS and public POS. In the response checking phase of private POS, some private information is needed. While in the response checking of public POS, the private information is not needed. Private POS is necessary in some cases. Recently Shen et al. presented delegable provable data possession (PDP) scheme [14] , in which data owner generates the delegation key for delegated verifier and store the key in CSSs for verification. Wang et al. also proposed a proxy provable data possession (PPDP) model [15] and provided a construction for it. In PPDP data owner can delegate its remote data possession checking capability to the proxy by sending it a warrant. The warrant will be stored both in the proxy and CSS.
In this paper, we propose a new private POS scheme, i.e., PC-DV POS, which can preserve clients' privacy and at the same time designate a verifier by the client signed the data blocks. In particular, we utilize group signatures and key exchange to construct
Related Work
Based on the pre-computed MACs stored on the verifier, the protocols proposed by Akavia et al. [2] and Naor et al. [3] can detect any data loss or corruption with high probability. Shacham et al. [4] proposed MAC-based batch verification for multiple data blocks. In 2007 Ateniese, et al. [5] proposed a PDP model to solve the storage problems of files. They divided the file into blocks, and computed a homomorphic tag [6] for each block, completed the proof of the data integrity by sampling and verifying the correspondence of the tags and blocks randomly. HavavShacham and Brent Waters [4] proposed an improved POR model under the security model defined in [7] , and had a very complete proof. Kevin D. Bowers et al. [8] and Yevgeniy Dodis et al. [9] made some theory and application extensions based on [4, 7] . Zheng and Xu also present a dynamic POR model in [10] . Ateniese improved PDP model to apply to public authentication in [11] . They replaced the homomorphic tags in [5] with homomorphic tags supported public authentication [12] . C. Erway [13] proposed dynamic PDP model based on PDP model. It maintained a skip-list for tags, and stored the root metadata in Client's hand to prevent replay attack.
Recently Shen et al. presented delegable provable data possession scheme [14] , in which data owner generates the delegation key for delegated verifier and store the key in CPSs for verification. A malicious CPS can control the delegation key and lead to the failure of the subsequent validation work. Wang et al. [15] also proposed a proxy provable data possession (PPDP) model and provided a construction for it. In PPDP data owner can delegate its remote data possession checking capability to the proxy by sending it a warrant. The warrant will be stored both in the proxy and CPS. Before the verification of the data, the both warrant are checked for consistency. If the CPS is malicious, it can reject all queries from the proxy and interrupt the implementation of the scheme. The problem is that the proxy or delegated verifier is not stateless to CSP. While the verifiers should be stateless, since such state is difficult to maintain if the verifier's machine crashes or if the verifier's role is delegated to third parties or distributed among multiple machine [4, 11] .
Preliminaries

System Model
PC-DV POS system consists of three different network entities: Client, cloud storage server and verifier. 1) Client: an entity, which has massive data which will be moved to cloud storage server for maintenance and computation, can be either individual consumer or organization;
2) Cloud Storage Server (CSS): an entity, which is managed by cloud service provider, has significant storage space and computation resource to maintain the clients' data;
Homomorphic Authenticable Group Signature [16]
Homomorphic Authenticable Group Signature contains five algorithms: KeyGen, Join, Sign, Verify and Open. In KeyGen, the group manager generates its private key and a group public key. In Join, the group manager is able to compute a private key for a new group client and add this user to the group client list. A group client signs messages using its private key and the group public key in Sign. In Verify, a verifier is able to check the correctness of a message using the group public key, but she cannot reveal the identity of the signer. The group manager can reveal the identity of the signer on a message in Open. .The group public key is gpk= 12 ( , , , , , , , )
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If all the three equations hold, the verifier accepts message m. Otherwise, she rejects this message.
Open. Only the group manager can trace a group signature and reveal the identity of the signer. Given a group public key gpk= 12 ( , , , , , , , )
g g h u v w  , the group manager's private key gmsk= 12 
( , )
 , a message m and a signature , the group manager reveals the identity of the signer as follows:
(1) Verify that the signature  is a valid signature on message m;
A as:
(3) Given i A , which is a part of client i's private key, the group manager is able to reveal the identity of the signer on message m.
PC-DV Proof of Storage Scheme
PC-DV proof of storage scheme includes six algorithms: KeyGen, Join, Sign, ProofGen, ProofVerify and Open.
Data M, which is going to be shared by clients, is divided into n blocks. Each block is further divided into k elements of p Z . Therefore, shared data Man be presented as
. There are also a pseudo random generator PRG: KeyGen. The original client, who acts as the group manager, first selects system parameters as in HAGS. Meanwhile, it also randomly computes a secret key pair
The group public key is gpk= 12 ( , , , , , , , )
 . The original client keeps  private. Both  and skp will be a part of a group user's private key, which is issued to group users later. The original user also privately shares Similar to the proof of Equation (13), the correctness of Equation (14) can be presented as 
All three equations are correct, therefore, a designated verifier in our scheme is able to correctly check the integrity of shared data M. Theorem 2.If the signature scheme is existentially unforgeable and the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard, no adversary against the soundness of our PC-DV POS scheme could cause verifier to accept in a POS instance with non-negligible probability, except by responding with correctly computed values.
Due to limited space, here we omit the proof. The proof will appear in the full version of the paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new private POS scheme, i.e., PC-DV POS, which can preserve clients' privacy and at the same time designate a verifier by the client signed the data blocks. In particular, we utilize group signatures and key exchange to construct homomorphic authenticators, so that only the designated verifier is able to check the integrity of shared data for users without retrieving the entire data, and cannot reveal the identities of signers on all blocks in shared data. Moreover the original client, who creates and shares the data in the cloud, is able to add new clients into a group without recomputing any verification information. In addition, the original user can act as the group manager to trace group signatures on shared data, and reveal the identities of signers when it is necessary.
